Showing posts with label Gronemeier. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gronemeier. Show all posts

Thursday, September 22, 2011

Del Mar Union’s legal battles

Source: Del Mar Times

By Marsha Sutton
Senior Education Writer

Bowing to the Great Bureaucracy, I reluctantly paid the San Diego County Office of Education $1.52 to receive a piece of paper listing all the legal fees incurred from December 3, 2010 to August 2, 2011 for the Sharon McClain vs. Del Mar Union School District litigation.

Although this information should be made available to the public without having to jump through so many hoops, particularly considering that it was a single, readily accessible page, sometimes it’s easier to give in than stand and fight on principle, when the amount of money is so minimal.

So that’s how we know the cost of this lawsuit is approaching $90,000 so far, excluding the hearings that took place last month and all the hearings and court actions yet to come.

McClain, the former DMUSD superintendent, sued the district last October after she was released in March 2010. In 2010, before the suit was filed, DMUSD superintendent Jim Peabody said the legal fees incurred by the district were $12,762.

Once the suit was filed, the district’s litigation insurance carrier, the San Diego County Schools Risk Management Joint Powers Authority, took over. At that point, all legal fees were covered by the JPA, less a $1,000 deductible and the district’s annual premium of $21,808, Peabody said.

According to information provided by SDCOE on that piece of paper, the insurance carrier paid $74,896.45 — all of it, except about $3,600 — to the district’s law firm on the case, Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz. With the district’s $12,762, this brings the total to about $87,600, to date.

Back in May, I attempted to learn the costs without having to comply with SDCOE’s ridiculous demand for $1.52 to receive the information. But Diane Crosier, SDCOE’s executive director of the San Diego and Imperial County schools JPA, refused to comment, referring me instead to DMUSD attorney, Dan Shinoff.

Shinoff did not reveal specifics but suggested that McClain’s attorney, Dale Gronemeier, was "trying to make it as expensive as possible."

Gronemeier, last week, objected to this comment, saying that Shinoff’s firm was the one employing delaying tactics and driving up costs.

In Sept. 14 and Sept. 15 emails, Gronemeier wrote, "The Shinoff firm has stonewalled on discovery since last December by filing evasive responses and baseless objections to interrogatories and document demands and by refusing to allow Board of Education members to be deposed."

He said Shinoff and his team "would not legitimately respond to the most obvious and simple discovery requests" and unnecessarily increased billing hours.

Gronemeier said Shinoff’s firm is paid an hourly rate, while his firm "is a hybrid partial hourly, partial contingent fee arrangement."

He said his fee structure pays most but not all of his firm’s overhead costs. To be paid personally, Gronemeier said he has to win the case. So billing extra hours, he said, "decrease[s] my firm’s profits from which I get paid rather than increasing them." He said his firm’s payment structure "disincentivizes me from milking a case."

The courts validated Gronemeier’s complaints, he said, at a hearing Aug. 19 when the judge ruled that the school district needed to provide documents requested months ago and allow the depositions of specific board members.

Regarding a possible settlement, DMUSD trustee Doug Rafner, in an email to Peabody dated May 17, 2011, wrote, "I personally would like to discuss resolving this case in some way that does not involve running the district through the mud. Would the ‘insurance’ pay for a settlement of a case, or only for judgments?"

Peabody responded to Rafner, writing, "We will get this on the agenda for the next meeting."

As this case churns through the courts, talk of a settlement seems to have dissipated.

CPRA lawsuit

These McClain-related emails were among those released by the district to Del Mar parent Michael Robertson after he filed a California Public Records Act request May 10 on an unrelated topic: the Week of Action last spring sponsored by the California Teachers’ Association, which was organized to rally parents and teachers to support more funding for education.

Robertson said the material he received was incomplete, and that the district and its lawyers (Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz) were unresponsive to repeated attempts to obtain all requested documents related to the Week of Action.

On Aug. 8 he filed a lawsuit against the DMUSD to force the district to comply with the CPRA request. To date, the district has not responded to the suit, he said.

A letter supporting Robertson from former Del Mar parents John and Susan Miller was entered into the public record at the school board’s July 27 meeting. The letter expressed "concern and disappointment with the district’s apparent reluctance to respond" to Robertson’s CPRA request.

"The community expects our elected and appointed leaders to fully embrace and promote the concept of complete transparency," the Millers wrote, asking the district to stop "delaying requests for information that belongs to the public."

Of all the excuses the district gave for denying Robertson’s request (a letter dated May 27, 2011 from DMUSD assistant superintendent of human resources, Tim Asfazadour, offers a number of reasons), none was more outrageous than this one: that the records sought are exempt from disclosure "because the public interest in not disclosing the information clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure."

It’s hard to believe a public employee would actually put a provocative statement like that in print. Makes you wonder what they’re hiding.

Unless the documents contain national security or nuclear secrets, no public interest can be served by suppressing this material. To claim the district can withhold what’s clearly public information to "safeguard the public interest" is patronizing, officious and insults our intelligence.

Meanwhile, taxpayer money is being spent to fight Robertson in court. Don’t expect Robertson to cave. This will drag on until the DMUSD releases those documents.

Marsha Sutton can be reached at SuttComm@san.rr.com.

Friday, June 4, 2010

McClain's attorney orders DMUSD trustees to state the causes for her termination

On June 1, 2010, former DMUSD superintendent Sharon McClain's attorney Elbie J. Hickambottom, Jr. of Gronemeier & Associates sent a letter to the DMUSD Board of Trustees reiterating Sharon McClain's prior request for a statement of cause(s) for her termination.

Hickambottom notes that by exercising her right to air the Board action terminating her employment contract in public session, McClain also waived her right to prevent potentially adverse information regarding her job performance from being publicized.

If McClain's lawsuit goes to trial, Hickambottom says he will file a motion to prevent any information about the reasons for McClain's termination that are not in the public record from being presented in court.

The Board of Trustees has until June 13 to satisfy McClain's request.

The letter from McClain's attorneys follows:

June 1, 2010

Steven McDowell, President
stevenatdmusd@yahoo.com
Dr. Annette Easton, Member
aeaston@san.rr.com
Doug Perkins, Member
doug4dmusd@yahoo.com
Comischell Rodriguez, Member
comischell@aol.com
Katherine White, Member
kwhite@shwx2.com
Board of Trustees
Del Mar Union School District

Re: McClain re Del Mar USD

Dear President McDowell and other Members of the Board of Trustees:

Dr. Sharon McClain has requested that the Board of Trustees provide her with a statement of cause(s) for her termination; to date, the Board of Trustees has failed to provide such a statement of cause(s). This letter reiterates her request.

As a general matter, the rationale for a governmental action such as the Board of Trustees’s termination of Dr. McClain’s employment contract on March 31, 2010, purportedly for cause, is determined based upon the rationale publicly articulated at the time of the governmental action. (1) For sound policy reasons, California law generally disfavors discovery during litigation of the subjective motivations of members of governing boards for their actions as a board; one of the benefits of that policy is that it spares members of a governing board the burden of having to respond to deposition or trial discovery of their subjective motivations.

Moreover, where employers fail to articulate the rationale for employment terminations at the time employees are discharged, the law allows juries to draw an adverse inference to employers that their subsequently articulated rationales are false rationales invented post-hoc to cover-up an unlawful motivation. (2)

Dr. McClain exercised her right to have the Board of Trustees’s action terminating her employment contract aired in a public session rather than in a closed session; she thereby waived any privacy right that entitled her to prevent assertedly adverse information about her performance that would presumably be the purported cause for terminating her employment contract from being publicly presented at the public session. Despite that waiver, the Board majority – and Mr. Shinoff, its representative who spoke at the March 31 meeting – failed to articulate during the meeting any cause for Dr. McClain’s employment termination. No closed session could legally have occurred concerning her termination given Dr. McClain’s exercise of her statutory right to require all proceedings concerning her termination be held publicly. (3) After the Board acted, Dr. McClain sent the Board of Trustees a request for a statement of cause(s), but the Board still has not articulated any cause for Dr. McClain’s employment termination.

As you presumably know, Dr. McClain’s position is that there is no good cause for the termination of her employment; rather, the three members of the Board majority asserted that there was cause simply for the purpose of trying not to make the contractual payment required for a termination without good cause. We would be pleased to proceed to litigate Dr. McClain’s entitlement based upon the current record of the Board of Trustees’s refusal to articulate any cause – i.e., its refusal at the time of the Board’s action and its refusal subsequently when Dr. McClain directly and now I on her behalf have requested a statement of cause(s). In a superior court action, you can expect that we will, among other things, file an in limine motion to restrict DMUSD to using the rationale in the public record rather than relying on Board Members to post-hoc assert their purported subjective motivations; that of course would leave the Board of Trustees without any cause to defend its position. If you would seek the advice of an independent and competent employment lawyer with trial experience on employment cases, I think you would get the sound advice that your stonewalling on the Board’s purported cause(s) for Dr. McClain’s employment termination is taking you down a dangerous road.

Our office has drafted a government code claim that is ready to be filed with the District in order to exhaust any claims-presentation requirements prior to filing a lawsuit. We will hold off filing it until June 13 to give the Board one last chance to publicly satisfy Dr. McClain’s request that the Board communicate the cause(s) for Dr. McClain’s employment termination. If the Board majority does not articulate the cause(s) for Dr. McClain’s employment termination, it will have to live with the consequences. Please govern yourselves accordingly.

Sincerely,

GRONEMEIER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
By Elbie J. Hickambottom, Jr.
Attorneys for Dr. Sharon McClain


(1) See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 721, 724-725.

(2) See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp. (1st Cir. 2000) 217F.3d46, 56 (summary judgment reversed where employer did not give the employee reasons for her terminating when it occurred but rather prepared a memo claiming performance deficiencies several weeks later when it became concerned the employee might file suit).

(3) If the Board of Trustees had discussed its purported cause for termination in closed session, doing so would have violated the Brown Act and thereby voided any action taken. Dr. McClain is not alleging that the Board did illegally determine its rationale; rather, she assumes that the Board did not violate the Brown Act.

More information:

Thursday, August 27, 2009

No Arbitration of Debt Action Against Attorneys

Source: Metropolitan News-Enterprise
By SHERRI M. OKAMOTO, Staff Writer

This district’s Court of Appeal yesterday rejected efforts by two Pasadena-area attorneys to compel arbitration of an ex-client’s claim for indemnification of a $25,000 judgment entered against her—based on a breach of a confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement the lawyers had negotiated with her former employer—arising from their firm’s activities to solicit new business.

Div. One’s unpublished opinion by Presiding Justice Robert M. Mallano explained that none of Patricia Dahlstrom’s causes of action against Neil J. Barker and Dale L. Gronemeier were related to their provision of legal services in her wrongful termination case against Litton Data Systems, and therefore the arbitration agreement she had signed was inapplicable to the dispute.

When Dahlstrom retained Gronemeier & Barker in 1991, she had signed a “Professional Services Agreement” which stated that the firm would “provide legal services…concerning [her] employment discrimination, breach of contract, and allied claims against Litton.”

The document also contained an arbitration provision which provided that any controversy or claim “ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT, THE BREACH THEREOF, THE SERVICES RENDERED BY G&B TO CLIENT, OR ANY ALLEGED BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE OR MALPRACTICE BY G&B” would be submitted to binding arbitration.

Gronemeier & Barker subsequently negotiated a settlement with Litton, obtaining an award for Dahlstrom which Mallano characterized as “substantial.”

This settlement was memorialized in a written agreement containing a confidentiality clause providing that Litton would be entitled to liquidated damages of $25,000 in the event of a breach by Dahlstrom.

In the fall of 1993, Barker allegedly contacted Dahlstrom and asked her to loan the firm $100,000, which she agreed to do.

Under the terms of a promissory note executed Sept. 29, 1993, the money was to be repaid within 12 months at an interest rate of 10 percent per annum.

Dahlstrom claimed that Gronemeier later told her that Litton was claiming she had breached the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement. She maintained that Litton’s assertion was based on a post-settlement letter sent to Litton employees by Gronemeier in an effort to generate new business for the firm.

Litton’s claim was submitted to arbitration, and Gronemeier & Barker represented Dahlstrom in those proceedings. After the arbitrator issued a $25,000 award against her, Dahlstrom said her attorneys promised to indemnify her for that amount.

Dahlstrom eventually filed suit against Barker and Gronemeier individually, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both claims were based on the allegations that Barker and Gronemeier had not repaid the loan nor fulfilled their promise to indemnify her for the arbitration award.

She sought damages of $76,128.61 on each cause of action.

The attorneys answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for “unjust enrichment and overpayment of promissory note due to mistake,” claiming they had overpaid Dahlstrom on the note by $2,250. Dahlstrom answered the cross-complaint.

Barker and Gronemeier then filed a motion to compel arbitration, insisting that the note had been paid in full, leaving only Dahlstrom’s claims for indemnification and breach of fiduciary duty to be decided.

Those claims, they argued, arose out of their provision of legal services in Dahlstrom’s case against Litton and were therefore subject to arbitration, pursuant to the terms of the Professional Services Agreement.

Dahlstrom filed opposition, including a declaration in which she stated her accounting records indicated the attorneys had not paid off the loan and that she had periodically submitted her accounting records to Barker and Gronemeier reflecting outstanding payments for both the loan and the judgment debt.

In reply, Barker and Gronemeier argued that Dahlstrom had improperly credited a prior payment to the indemnification obligation instead of the loan. If the payment had been properly credited, they contended, the loan would have been overpaid, and the indemnification claim, part of which was still outstanding, had to be arbitrated.

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Edward A. Ferns conducted a hearing on the motion to compel in September 2008 and found that none of Dahlstrom’s causes of action were subject to arbitration.

Joined by Justices Victoria Gerrard Chaney and Jeffrey W. Johnson, Mallano agreed with Ferns’ ruling.

As the offending solicitation letter which resulted in the judgment against Dahlstrom was sent “long after” Barker and Gronemeier had settled Dahlstrom’s wrongful termination case and the firm was no longer representing her in regard to that matter, Mallano reasoned that Dahlstrom’s indemnification claim was not based on the provision of any legal service.

“In short, the indemnification claim arose out of and was related to G&B’s own economic interests in obtaining new clients, not any interest the firm was pursuing on Dahlstrom’s behalf,” he wrote.

Mallano also concluded the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was based on the promissory note and the promise of indemnification, not the legal services rendered to Dahlstrom, and so the arbitration provision did not apply to either of Dahlstrom’s claims.

Elbie J. Hickambottom Jr. of Gronemeier & Associates PC represented Barker and Gronemeier, while Jeffrey A. Lipow of Smith & Lipow represented Dahlstrom.

Lipow said he had viewed the case as “kind of a frivolous appeal of a frivolous effort to try and force a case out of the courthouse when clearly the facts didn’t justify that,” remarking that the lesson to be learned from yesterday’s decision was “if you borrow money from your client, pay it off.”

He said that the case is set for trial Sept. 14 but that the parties will be appearing today to stipulate for a continuance to engage in mediation.

Hickambottom declined to comment, saying he had not yet reviewed the decision, and neither Barker nor Gronemeier could be reached for comment.

The case is Dahlstrom v. Barker, B211718.


More information: